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Abstract
The main idea of the distance rationalizability approach to view the voters’ preferences as an
imperfect approximation to some kind of consensus is deeply rooted in social choice literature. It
allows one to define (“rationalize”) voting rules via a consensus class of elections and a distance:
a candidate is said to be an election winner if she is ranked first in one of the nearest (with
respect to the given distance) consensus elections. It is known that many classic voting rules
can be distance rationalized. In this paper, we provide new results on distance rationalizability
of several Condorcet-consistent voting rules. In particular, we distance rationalize Young’s rule
and Maximin rule using distances similar to the Hamming distance. We show that the claim that
Young’s rule can be rationalized by the Condorcet consensus class and the Hamming distance
is incorrect; in fact, these consensus class and distance yield a new rule which has not been
studied before. We prove that, similarly to Young’s rule, this new rule has a computationally
hard winner determination problem.
1 Introduction
The problem of defining what is meant by an electoral consensus has been a particulariy contentious
one. Condorcet approached this problem from the point of view of pairwise comparisons. He
suggested that, if an alternative obtains a simple majority over any other alternative, then it should
win the election. This principle is known as Condorcet rule and the winner as Condorcet alternative.
Despite all its attractiveness this principle has a major drawback: a Condorcet alternative does not
always exist. Various methods of extending Condorcet rule to all elections have been proposed; one
of the most attractive ways to do so was suggested by Young (1977). He viewed the problem of social
choice as a problem in pattern recognition. In cases where the “pattern” of consensus is unclear—
that is, a Condorcet alternative does not exist—he suggested to use the majority principle and to
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search for the largest subset of voters for which the pattern is clear and a Condorcet alternative
exists. ? (?) expressed similar ideas with respect to the unanimity rule.
Distance rationalizability is a framework formalizing this research direction. The idea of this
framework is to view the voters’ collection of preferences, or a preference profile, as an imperfect
approximation to some kind of consensus. Identifying the “closest” consensus profile we “recognize
the pattern.” The winner is then the most preferred candidate in this closest consensus profile.
A voting rule can be defined by picking a particular notion of a consensus and a particular no-
tion of closeness. This closeness must be measured by a distance function since violations of the
triangle inequality may lead to undesirable effects. These ideas has been explored by several au-
thors (Baigent, 1987; Klamler, 2005b, 2005a) under a variety of names; a fairly comprehensive list
of distance-rationalizability results is provided by Meskanen and Nurmi (2008).
A surprisingly large number of voting rules have been already classified as distance rational-
izable. ? (?) distance rationalized Plurality and Borda, Meskanen and Nurmi (2008), among
other rules, provide distance rationalizations of Veto, Copeland, Slater, and STV, and Elkind, Fal-
iszewski, and Slinko (2009) show that all scoring rules, as well as the Bucklin rule,1 are also distance
rationalizable. Some rules, like Dodgson’s rule or Kemeny rule, have been initially defined in terms
of a consensus class and a distance so no additional rationalization was required. Effectively the
idea has developed into a project of classification of existing voting rules by two parameters: a
consensus class and a distance.
However, up to date this classification has contained some gaps. Paradoxically enough one of
them relates to Young’s rule which appeared to be notoriously tricky to rationalize. Meskanen and
Nurmi (2008) claim that Young’s rule obtains if we employ the Condorcet consensus class and the
Hamming distance over the profiles, however this is not true.
The first goal of this paper is to show that the statement of Meskanen and Nurmi is wrong. In
fact, using the Condorcet consensus class and the Hamming distance we obtain a new rule which
is different from Young’s rule and also any other known rule. We call it voter replacement rule
until a better name for it is found. We study this rule and prove that, similarly to Young’s rule, it
has a computationally hard winner determination problem. The second goal is to provide a correct
distance rationalizability results both for Young’s rule and Maximin rule filling the existing gaps.
Creating distances for these rules appeared to be more involved than one’s intuition might initially
suggest.
Our paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we formally describe our model of elections
and the distance rationalizability framework, tailored to the case of Condorcet consensus. Then,
in Section 3 we show that Young’s rule and Maximin are both distance rationalizable via distances
which are, in spirit, similar to Hamming distance. We show that the rule obtained by Hamming
distance itself is different from Young’s rule. We prove that the winner determination problem for
this new rule is computationally hard.
We discuss our results and present further research directions in Section 4. In the appendix we
very briefly describe fundamental notions of the computational complexity theory.
2 Preliminaries
An election E is a triple (C, V,O), where C = {c1, . . . , cm} is a set of candidates, V = {v1, . . . , vn}
is a set of voters, and O = (o1, . . . , on) is a preference profile, i.e., a vector of preference orders of the
1Also known as majoritarian compromise.
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voters in V . For each i = 1, . . . , n, oi is a strict total order over the candidates in C. For readability,
we sometimes write ≻i instead of oi. For example, given a candidate set C = {c1, c2, c3}, and a
voter vi that likes c2 best, then c1, and then c3, we write c2 ≻i c1 ≻i c3. We remark that it is
common to identify the voter set V with the preference profile (o1, . . . , on). However, since in this
paper we will consider actions that modify the set of voters, it will be more convenient to treat V
and (o1, . . . , on) as two distinct objects.
A voting rule R (or, more precisely, a social choice correspondence R) is a function that given
an election E = (C, V,O) outputs a set R(E) ⊆ C of winners of the election. Note that we do
not require |R(E)| = 1. Indeed, there are cases where, e.g., due to symmetry, it is impossible to
declare a single winner, in which case we may have R(E) = ∅ or |R(E)| > 1. In practice, one
may then need to use a draw resolution rule, which can be either deterministic (e.g., lexicographic)
or randomized (e.g., a fair coin toss); however, in the rest of this paper we will ignore this issue.
Perhaps the best known voting rule is the Plurality rule Rplur, which elects those candidates who
are ranked first by the largest number of voters.
We say that a candidate ci is a Condorcet winner in an election E = (C, V,O) if for each cj ∈ C,
ci 6= cj , a strict majority of voters prefers ci to cj . While not every election has a Condorcet winner,
the notion is so appealing that many rules—so-called Condorcet-consistent rules—are designed to
select the Condorcet winner if it exists. For example, Dodgson’s rule selects those candidates
who can be made Condorcet winners by the least number of swaps of adjacent candidates in the
preference orders of the voters.
Intuitively, a preference profile corresponds to a consensus among the voters when there exists an
alternative that is clearly better from the collective point of view than any other one. For example,
one could consider strongly unanimous profiles, where all voters rank candidates identically, or
weakly unanimous profiles, where all voters agree on the top-ranked candidate. In either case it is
obvious that the top-ranked candidate is clearly better than any other one. Throughout this paper,
we consider a weaker type of consensus, which is inspired by the idea that a Condorcet winner,
when one exists, presents an acceptable compromise between different voters’ preferences. That is,
we say that an election is a consensus election if it has a Condorcet winner; we denote the set of
all such elections by C. For technical reasons, we assume that C does not contain an election with
an empty set of voters.
Given a set X, we say that a function d : X ×X → R ∪ {+∞} is a distance (or metric) over X
if for each x, y ∈ X it satisfies the following four axioms:
(1) d(x, y) ≥ 0 (non-negativity),
(2) d(x, y) = 0 if and only if x = y (identity of indiscernibles),
(3) d(x, y) = d(y, x) (symmetry), and
(4) for each z ∈ X, d(x, y) ≤ d(x, z) + d(z, y) (triangle inequality).
In what follows, the elements of the set X will usually be either voters (i.e., preference orders) or
elections.
Any distance d(o, o′) over voters with preferences over a candidate set C can be extended to
a distance d̂(E1, E2) over elections E1 = (C, V,O1) and E2 = (C, V,O2) with O1 = (o11, . . . , o
1
n),
O2 = (o21, . . . , o
2
n) by setting d̂(E
1, E2) =
∑n
i=1 d(o
1
i , o
2
i ). Clearly, d̂ satisfies all distance axioms as
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long as d does.2
We now provide two examples of distances defined over pairs of voters with preferences over a
set of candidates C. Our first example is the discrete distance ddiscr(o, o
′), given by ddiscr(o, o
′) =
1 if o 6= o′ and ddiscr(o, o
′) = 0 otherwise. Clearly, the corresponding distance over elections
d̂discr(E
1, E2) is equivalent to the Hamming distance dH(E
1, E2), which is defined as dH(E
1, E2) =
|{i | o1i 6= o
2
i }|. Our second example is the Dodgson distance, or swap distance, dswap(o, o
′), defined
as dswap(o, o
′) = |{(c1, c2) ∈ C
2 | c1 o c2, c2 o
′ c1}|. It is not hard to check that both the Dodgson
distance and the discrete distance (and hence the Hamming distance) satisfy the distance axioms
listed above. (Note that, formally, both of these distances are defined only for pairs of elections
with the same candidate sets and the same voter sets; if either of these conditions is not met, we
assume that the distance is ∞.)
We are now ready to define distance rationalizability. The following two definitions are special-
ized to rationalizability with respect to Condorcet consensus, but can be adapted to apply to other
consensus classes in a straightforward manner.
Definition 1. Let d be a distance over elections. We define the (C, d)-score of a candidate ci in
an election E to be the distance (according to d) between E and a closest election E′ where ci is
the Condorcet winner. The set of (C, d)-winners of an election E = (C, V,O) consists of those
candidates in C whose (C, d)-score is smallest.
Definition 2. A voting rule R is distance-rationalizable via Condorcet consensus and a distance
d over elections, or (C, d)-rationalizable, if for each election E, a candidate c is an R-winner of E
if and only if she is a (C, d)-winner of E.
For example, Dodgson’s rule is (C, d̂swap)-rationalizable. This result follows directly from the
definition of Dodgson’s rule and witnesses that at least some voting rules are naturally represented
within the distance rationalizability framework.
3 Main Results
In this section we present our results on voting rules that can be rationalized with respect to
the Condorcet consensus via Hamming-type distances that correspond to adding, deleting, and
replacing voters. It is important to have in mind that, when we speak, for example, about deleting
voters, no voters are actually being deleted. They are just excluded from consideration in a search
of a maximal subgroup in the electorate that possesses a Condorcet winner.
To begin, observe that, given an election E = (C, V,O) with |V | = n, we can make any candidate
c ∈ C the Condorcet winner by adding at most n+1 voters that rank c first. Similarly, we can make
c the Condorcet winner by replacing at most ⌊n/2⌋ + 1 voters in V with voters that rank c first.
While not every candidate can be made the Condorcet winner by voter deletion—for example, if
a candidate is ranked last by all voters, he will not become the Condorcet winner no matter how
many voters we delete—it is still the case that, if at least one voter ranks a given candidate first,
this candidate can be made the Condorcet winner by removing at most n − 1 voters. Thus, for
each candidate c we can define her score with respect to each of these operations as the number
of voters that need to be inserted, replaced, or removed, respectively, to make c the Condorcet
2We point the reader to the work of Elkind et al. (2009) for an extensive discussion of distance rationalizability
via distances of this type.
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winner (for deletion, some candidates will have a score of +∞). We will refer to these scores as the
insertion score, the replacement score and the deletion score, respectively. Intuitively, for each of
these scores, the candidates with a lower score are closer to being the consensus winners than the
candidates with a higher score, so each of these scores can be used to define a voting rule.
In fact, there is a well-known voting rule that is defined in these terms, namely, Young’s rule,
which elects the candidates with the lowest deletion score. Thus, it is natural to ask if the two
other scores defined above, i.e., the replacement score and the insertion score, also correspond to
well-known voting rules. Another interesting question is whether all three of these scores can be
transformed into distances, i.e., whether the corresponding voting rules are distance-rationalizable
with respect to the Condorcet consensus; observe that this issue is more complicated than might
appear at the first sight, since we have to satisfy the symmetry axiom. Providing answers to these
questions is the main contribution of our paper.
We will first answer the second question by showing how to transform each of our three scores
into a distance. The easiest case is that of the replacement score. Formally, given an election
E = (C, V,O), the replacement score sr(c) of a candidate c ∈ C is the smallest value of k such that
there exists an election E = (C, V,O′) obtained by changing the preferences of exactly k voters in V
in which c is the Condorcet winner; as argued above, sr(c) ≤ ⌊n/2⌋+1 for all c ∈ C. It is immediate
that the replacement score of any c ∈ C is exactly the Hamming distance from E to the closest
election over the set of candidates C in which c is the Condorcet winner. Thus, the corresponding
voting rule is (C, dH )-rationalizable. We will refer to this rule as the voter replacement rule. We
postpone the discussion of whether this rule is equivalent to any voting rule considered in the
literature till the end of the section.
The insertion score si(c) of a candidate c ∈ C in an election E = (C, V,O) is defined as the
smallest number k ≥ 0 such that there exists a set of voters V ′, |V ′| = k, with a preference profile
O′ over C such that c is the Condorcet winner in E′ = (C, V ∪V ′, O ◦O′), where O ◦O′ denotes the
concatenation of the preference profiles O and O′. Similarly, the deletion score sd(c) of a candidate
c ∈ C in an election E = (C, V,O) is defined as the smallest number k ≥ 0 such that there exists a
subset of voters V ′ ⊆ V , |V ′| = k, such that c is the Condorcet winner in E′ = (C, V \ V ′, O \O′),
and +∞ if c cannot be made the Condorcet winner in this manner. Here, O \ O′ denotes the
preference profile obtained from O by deleting the preference orders of voters in V ′.
Now, it is easy to see that both the insertion score and the deletion score naturally correspond to
quasidistances, i.e., mappings that satisfy non-negativity, identity of indiscernibles and the triangle
inequality, but not symmetry. Indeed, given two elections E = (C, V,O) and E = (C, V ′, O′) over
the same set of candidates C, we can define a function d′i(E,E
′) by setting d′i(E,E
′) = k if oi = o
′
i
for each vi ∈ V ∩ V
′, V ⊆ V ′ and |V ′ \ V | = k, and d′i(E,E
′) = +∞ otherwise. Similarly, we can
define d′d(E,E
′) by setting d′d(E,E
′) = k if oi = o
′
i for each vi ∈ V ∩ V
′, V ′ ⊆ V and |V \ V ′| = k,
and d′d(E,E
′) = +∞ otherwise. It is not hard to verify that both d′i and d
′
d are quasidistances.
Moreover, for each candidate in C his insertion score si(c) is equal to the d
′
i-distance from E to
the nearest (with respect to d′i) election in C in which c is the Condorcet winner. Similarly, c’s
deletion score sd(c) is equal to the d
′
d-distance from E to the nearest (with respect to d
′
d) election
in C in which c is the Condorcet winner. We will now show that we can replace both of these
quasidistances with true distances.
For d′i the solution is simple: we can make d
′
i symmetric by allowing ourselves to delete voters
as well as to add voters, as, intuitively, deleting a voter is never more useful than adding a voter.
Formally, given two elections E = (C, V,O) and E = (C, V ′, O′) over the same set of candidates C,
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we set di(E,E
′) = |V \ V ′|+ |V ′ \ V | if oi = o
′
i for all vi ∈ V ∩ V
′ and di(E,E
′) = +∞ otherwise.
Clearly, di is a distance. Moreover, we will now show that for our purposes it is indistinguishable
from d′i.
Proposition 3. Consider an election E = (C, V,O), a candidate c ∈ C, and a k > 0. Then there
exists an election E1 = (C, V 1, O1) ∈ C such that c is the Condorcet winner of E1 and d′i(E,E
1) ≤ k
if and only if there exists an election E2 = (C, V 2, O2) ∈ C such that c is the Condorcet winner of
E2 and di(E,E
2) ≤ k.
Proof. The “only if” direction is immediate: if d′i(E,E
1) ≤ k, then di(E,E
1) ≤ k, so we can
set E2 = E1. For the “if” direction, suppose that E2 has been obtained from E by deleting a
subset of voters V ′ ⊆ V , |V ′| = k1, and adding a set of voters V
′′ with a preference profile O′′,
|V ′′| = k2. Now, consider an election E
3 obtained from E by first adding the voters in V ′′ and
then adding another k1 voters that rank c first. Clearly, d
′
i(E,E
3) = di(E,E
2) ≤ k. We will now
show that c is the Condorcet winner in E3. Indeed, fix an arbitrary voter c′ ∈ C. Suppose that
in (C, V ∪ V ′′, O ◦O′′) there are x voters that prefer c to c′ and y voters that prefer c′ to c. Then
in E2 there are at most x voters that prefer c to c′ and at least y − k1 voters that prefer c
′ to c.
Since c is the Condorcet winner of E2, we have x > y − k1. Now, in E
3 there are x + k1 voters
that prefer c to c′ and y voters that prefer c′ to c. As we have argued that x + k1 > y, it follows
that the majority of voters in E3 prefer c to c′. As this is true for any c′ 6= c, it follows that c is
the Condorcet winner in E3. Moreover, E3 has been obtained from E by candidate insertion only,
so we can set E1 = E3.
Clearly, we cannot use the same solution for d′d. Indeed, the argument above demonstrates that
adding voters is more useful than deleting voters. Thus, we need to construct a metric that makes
it expensive to add voters. As this metric has to be symmetric, a natural approach would be to
make the distance between two elections depend on the number of voters in the larger of them, as
well as on the difference in the number of voters. For example, given two elections E = (C, V,O)
and E′ = (C, V ′, O′), we could try to set
d(E,E′) =
{
||V | − |V ′||+ (max{|V |, |V ′|})2 if oi = o
′
i for each i ∈ V ∩ V
′
+∞ otherwise.
However, it turns out that this approach does not quite work: under this metric, deleting sd(c)
voters may still be more expensive than first deleting some s′ < sd(c) voters and then adding
a few voters that rank c first. To overcome this difficutly, we construct a metric that makes it
prohibitively difficult to do insertion and deletion at the same time.
Formally, for any pair of elections E = (C, V,O), E′ = (C, V ′, O′) over the same set of candidates
C such that oi = o
′
i for each i ∈ V ∩ V
′, we set k = ||V | − |V ′||, M = max{|V |, |V ′|}, and let
dd(E,E
′) =

0 if V = V ′
2− 1
k+M2+1
if V ⊂ V ′ or V ′ ⊂ V
+∞ otherwise.
Also, we set dd(E,E
′) = +∞ if oi 6= o
′
i for some i ∈ V ∩V
′. The function dd(E,E
′) is not a metric,
as it does not satisfy the triangle inequality. However, we can use it to construct a metric dd by
setting dd(E,E
′) = min{dd(E,E1) + dd(E1, E2) + · · ·+ dd(Eℓ, E
′) | ℓ ∈ N, E1, . . . , Eℓ ∈ EC}, where
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EC denotes the set of all elections with the set of candidates C. Intuitively, dd(E,E
′) is the shortest
path distance in the graph whose vertices are elections in EC , and the edge lengths are given by
dd. It is well known that for any graph with non-negative edge lengths the shortest path distance
satisfies the triangle inequality; it should be clear that dd satisfies all other axioms of a metric as
well. Observe that for any two elections E,E′ ∈ EC such that E = (C, V,O), E
′ = (C, V ′, O′) and
oi = o
′
i for each i ∈ V ∩V
′, we have dd(E,E
′) < 2 if V ⊆ V ′ or V ′ ⊆ V and dd(E,E
′) > 2 otherwise.
We will now show that dd can be used to rationalize Young’s rule with respect to the Condorcet
consensus.
Proposition 4. Consider an election E = (C, V,O), |V | = n, and two candidates c1, c2 ∈ C such
that sd(c1) < +∞ or sd(c2) < +∞. For i = 1, 2, let di be the dd-distance from ci to the closest
(with respect to dd) election over C in which ci is a Condorcet winner, Then sd(c1) < sc(c2) if and
only if d1 < d2.
Proof. Suppose first that sd(c1) = k1 < +∞, sd(c2) = k2 < +∞. Then one can obtain an election
over C in which c1 (respectively, c2) is the Condorcet winner by deleting k1 (respectively k2)
voters from E; denote this election by E1 (respectively, E2). We have dd(E,E1) = 2 −
1
k1+n2+1
,
dd(E,E2) = 2 −
1
k2+n2+1
. We claim that d1 = dd(E,E1). Indeed, suppose that this is not the
case, i.e., dd(E,E1) > d1. This means that there exists an election E
′ = (C, V ′, O′) such that c1
is the Condorcet winner of E′ and dd(E,E
′) < dd(E,E1). As E
′ cannot be obtained from E by
deleting voters, it holds that V ′ 6⊆ V . Now, if also V 6⊆ V ′, we immediately obtain dd(E,E
′) > 2,
a contradiction with dd(E,E1) < 2. Hence, it must be the case that V ⊂ V
′, so |V ′| ≥ n + 1,
and we have dd(E,E
′) ≥ 2 − 12+(n+1)2 . On the other hand, we have k1 ≤ n − 1, which implies
dd(E,E1) ≤ 2 −
1
n−1+n2+1
. As 2 − 1
2+(n+1)2
> 2 − 1
n−1+n2+1
, this gives a contradiction as well.
Similarly, we can show that d2 = dd(E,E2). Hence, it follows that k1 < k2 if and only if d1 < d2.
Now suppose that sd(c1) < +∞, sd(c2) = +∞ (the case sd(c1) = +∞, sd(c2) < +∞ is
symmetric). Then we have d1 ≤ 2 −
1
n+n2 , d2 ≥ 2−
1
2+(n+1)2 , since we cannot trasform E into an
election over C in which c2 is the Condorcet winner by candidate deletion only. Thus, in this case,
too, sd(c1) < sd(c2) if and only if d1 < d2.
Since in any election there is at least one candidate c with sd(c) < +∞, Proposition 4 immedi-
ately implies the following result.
Theorem 5. Young’s rule is (C, dd)-rationalizable.
We now turn to the first of the two questions posed in the beginning of this section. We
have observed that the voter deletion-based rule is equivalent to Young’s rule; the proof follows
immediately from the definitions of both rules. We will now show that the voter insertion-based
rule is equivalent to another well-known rule, namely, Maximin. Under Maximin, the score of each
voter is the outcome of his worst pairwise election. Formally, given an election E = (C, V,O), for
each cj ∈ C we set sM(cj) = min{#{i : cj ≻i ck} | ck ∈ C}. The winners are then the candidates c
with the highest Maximin score sM (c).
Proposition 6. For any election E = (C, V,O), |V | = n, and any candidate c ∈ C we have
si(c) = n− 2sM (c) + 1, where si(c) is the insertion score of c and sM (c) is the Maximin score of c.
Proof. Fix an election E = (C, V,O), |V | = n, and a candidate cj ∈ C. Set t = sM(cj). Let ck be
one of cj ’s worst pairwise opponents, i.e., |{q : cj ≻q ck}| = t. Now, if we add n − 2t + 1 voters
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that rank cj first, for any cℓ 6= cj there are at most n− t voters that rank cℓ above cj and at least
t+n−2t+1 = n− t+1 voters that rank cj above cℓ, so cj is the Condorcet winner of the resulting
election. On the other hand, if we add at most n − 2t new voters to E, in the resulting election
there will be at least n − t voters that prefer ck to cj and at most t + n − 2t = n − t voters that
prefer cj to ck, so in this case ck prevents cj from becoming the Condorcet winner.
Thus, the candidates with the highest Maximin score are exactly the candidates with the lowest
insertion score. Together with Proposition 3, this implies the following result.
Theorem 7. Maximin is (C, di)-rationalizable.
The situation with the voter replacement rule is more complicated. Meskanen and Nurmi (2008)
claim that Young’s rule is (C, dH )-rationalizable. As we have argued that the voter replacement rule
is (C, dH )-rationalizable, this would imply that the voter replacement rule is equivalent to Young’s
rule, or, in other words, deleting voters is equivalent to replacing voters. However, it turns out that
this is not true.
Theorem 8. There exists an election in which the voter replacement rule and Young’s rule declare
different candidates as winners.
Proof. We construct an election E = (C, V,O) with C = {a, b, c, d} and |V | = 29. Among the first
5 voters in V , there are 2 voters with preference order a ≻ b ≻ c ≻ d, 2 voters with preference order
a ≻ c ≻ d ≻ b, and 1 voter with preference order a ≻ b ≻ d ≻ c.
Further, there are 8 voters with preferences b ≻ c ≻ a ≻ d (b-voters), 8 voters with preferences
c ≻ d ≻ a ≻ b (c-voters), and 8 voters with preferences d ≻ b ≻ a ≻ c (d-voters).
We summarize the numbers of voters that prefer x to y for x, y ∈ {a, b, c, d} in the table below;
we write x > y : t to denote the fact that there are t voters that prefer x to y.
a > b : 13, b > a : 16, b > c : 19, c > b : 10
a > c : 13, c > a : 16, b > d : 11, d > b : 18
a > d : 13, d > a : 16, c > d : 20, d > c : 9
Let us now compute sr(x) and sd(x) for x ∈ {b, c, d}. Candidate b wins pairwise elections against a
and c, but loses to d by 7 votes. Hence, sd(b) ≥ 8. On the other hand, deleting 8 votes is sufficient:
indeed, deleting all c-voters makes b the Condorcet winner. Thus, sd(b) = 8. For the same reason,
we need to replace at least 4 voters to make b the Condorcet winner (each replacement reduces
d’s margin of victory over b by at most 2), and, indeed, replacing 4 of the c-voters with 4 voters
that rank b first makes b the Condorcet winner. Hence, sr(b) = 4. Similarly, c loses the pairwise
election to b by 9 votes, so we have sd(c) ≥ 10, sr(c) ≥ 5 (we can show that, in fact, sd(c) = 10 and
sr(c) = 5, but this is not needed for our proof), and d loses the pairwise election to c by 11 votes,
so we have sd(d) ≥ 12, sr(d) ≥ 6.
Now, it is not hard to see that sr(a) ≤ 3: after we replace one b-voter, one c-voter and one
d-voter with voters that rank a first, for each x = b, c, d we have 15 voters that prefer a to x and
14 voters that prefer x to a. Thus, we have sr(a) < sr(x) for x = b, c, d. To complete the proof, we
will now argue that sd(a) > sd(b). Specifically, we will show that sd(a) ≥ 12.
Indeed, it is clear that to make a the Condorcet winner, it is never optimal to delete any of the
first five voters. Now, suppose that we can make a the Condorcet winner by deleting a set S of
voters, |S| < 12. Suppose first that S contains at least 4 voters of a particular type (i.e., b-voters,
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c-voters, or d-voters); without loss of generality, we can assume that S contains 4 b-voters. After
these voters have been deleted, a loses to d by 7 votes, so we need to delete at least 8 more voters,
i.e., at least 12 voters altogether, a contradiction. Hence, we can now assume that S contains at
most 3 voters of each type. Next, suppose that S contains exactly 3 voters of some type; again,
without loss of generality we can assume that those are b-voters. After these voters have been
deleted, a loses to d by 6 votes, so we have to additionally delete at least 7 other voters, i.e., at
least 4 voters of some other type, a contradiction. Hence, S contains at most 2 voters of each
type. Now, consider an arbitrary voter in S; without loss of generality we can assume that this is a
b-voter. After this voter has been deleted, a loses to d by 4 votes, so we need to additionally delete
at least 5 other voters, i.e., at least 3 voters of some other type, a contradiction. We conclude that
sd(a) ≥ 12.
In fact, the voter replacement rule, despite having a very natural definition in terms of dis-
tances and consensuses, appears not to be equivalent to any known voting rule. The only brief
reference to this rule that we could find in the literature is due to Faliszewski, Hemaspaandra,
and Hemaspaandra (2009), where the authors interpret this rule as a variant of the Dodgson rule,
and show (Faliszewski et al. (2009), Theorem 5.7) that the problem of finding the winners for the
voter replacement rule is tractable (i.e., solvable in polynomial time) under the assumption that the
number of candidates is fixed (in fact, their proof establishes something slightly stronger, namely
that the problem is fixed parameter tractable; see (Niedermeier, 2006; Downey & Fellows, 1999)
for introduction to parameterized complexity). In contrast, we will now show that without this
assumption determining winners under the voter replacement rule is computationally hard (this is
also the case for Young’s rule; see the work of Rothe, Spakowski, and Vogel (2003)).
Theorem 9. Given an election E = (C, V,O) and a candidate p ∈ C, it is NP-hard to decide if p
is a winner of E under the voter replacement rule.
Proof. We provide a many-one polynomial-time reduction from Vertex Cover. An instance of
Vertex Cover is given by a pair (Γ = (X,Y ); k) where Γ is a graph with a vertex set X and
an edge set Y , and k ∈ N. It is a “yes”-instance if Γ has a vertex cover of size at most k, and a
“no”-instance otherwise.
We can assume that |X| is divisible by 3, i.e., |X| = 3q for some q ∈ N, and |X| > 3k + 6.
Indeed, to show that such a restricted problem is NP-hard, we can reduce the unrestricted version
of Vertex Cover to it by adding a large enough “star” which is not connected to the rest of the
graph. We can also assume that Γ has no isolated vertices, and therefore |Y | ≥ |X|/2.
Given an instance (Γ = (X,Y ); k) of Vertex Cover with |X| = N , |Y | =M , we construct an
election E = (C, V,O) as follows. Suppose that X = {x1, . . . , xN}, Y = {y1, . . . , yM}. Our election
will have M + 5 candidates y1, . . . , yM , a, b, c, p, z and 2N − 3 voters. We identify the candidates
y1, . . . , yM with the corresponding edges of Γ. The first N voters correspond to the vertices of Γ.
Specifically, for i = 1, . . . , N , let Yi ⊂ Y be the set of edges incident to xi. Then the voter vi ranks
a, b, and c on top, followed by the candidates in Yi, followed by p, followed by the candidates in
Y \ Yi, followed by z. We will specify the relative ordering of a, b and c, as well as the relative
ordering of the candidates in Yi and Y \ Yi in vi’s vote later on.
All remaining N − 3 voters rank all candidates in Y above a, b, c and p. Among those voters,
there are k − 2 voters with preferences a ≻ p ≻ b ≻ c, k − 2 voters with preferences b ≻ p ≻ c ≻ a,
k − 2 voters with preferences c ≻ p ≻ a ≻ b and N − 3k + 3 voters that prefer p to a, b, and c.
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Furthermore, N − k− 1 of the last N − 3 voters rank z first, while the remaining k− 2 voters rank
z last.
First, it is easy to see that sr(z) = k. Indeed, there are N − k − 1 voters that rank z first, and
N + k − 2 voters that rank z last. Replacing k of the voters that rank z last with ones that rank
him first will make z a majority winner, whereas if we replace less than k voters, more than half
of the voters would still rank z last. We will now argue that (a) sr(p) ≤ k if and only if Γ has a
vertex cover of size at most k; (b) we can complete the specification of the voters’ preferences so
that the replacement score of any candidate other than p and z is greater than k.
The first part is easy. Indeed, suppose that we can make p the Condorcet winner by replacing
at most k voters. We claim that all voters that we replace are among the first N voters. Indeed, in
E there are N + k − 2 voters that prefer a to p and N − k − 1 voters that prefer p to a. Thus, we
have to replace exactly k voters that prefer a to p. On the other hand, in E there are N + k − 2
voters that prefer b to p and N − k− 1 voters that prefer p to b. Thus, we have to replace exactly k
voters that prefer b to p. Now, there is no voter among the last N − 3 voters that ranks both a and
b above p, which proves our claim. Now, consider a candidate yi, i = 1, . . . ,M . Among the first
N voters, there are exactly two voters (corresponding to the endpoints of the edge yi) that prefer
yi to p. Hence, altogether there are N − 1 voters that prefer p to yi and N − 2 voters that prefer
yi to p. Thus, for every candidate yi we have to replace at least one voter that ranks him above
p, and such a voter corresponds to an endpoint of yi. Hence, the set of replaced voters directly
corresponds to a vertex cover of Γ. Similarly, suppose that X ′ ⊂ X, |X ′| ≤ k, is a vertex cover for
Γ. Then by replacing the corresponding voters with voters that rank p first we can ensure that p
beats all candidates in Y . Clearly, p also beats z. Finally, if |X ′| < k, we replace another k − |X ′|
of the first N voters with voters that rank p first. After this step, p beats a, b, and c, so he becomes
the Condorcet winner after at most |X ′|+ k − |X ′| = k voter replacements.
It remains to show that we can ensure that none of the remaining candidates is close to being a
Condorcet winner. For a, b, and c this is easy to achieve. Set t = 2N − 3, and require that at least
t/3 voters prefer a to b to c, at least t/3 voters prefer b to c to a, and at least t/3 voters prefert c
to a to b (recall that by our assumption N is divisible by 3). This ensures that a, b, and c prevent
each other from becoming the Condorcet winners: indeed, at least 2t/3 voters prefer a to b, at least
2t/3 voters prefer b to c, and at least 2t/3 voters prefer c to a, so the replacement score of each of
these candidates is at least ⌈t/6⌉ > k.
We use a similar construction for the candidates in Y . Specifically, if 2N − 3 ≤ M , we would
like the i-th voter, i = 1, . . . , 2N − 3, to have a preference ordering (as restricted to Y ) given by
yM−i+2 ≻ · · · ≻ yM ≻ y1 ≻ · · · ≻ yM−i+1, (1)
where we identify yM+j with yj . If 2N − 3 > M , we would like to divide the voters into ⌈
2N−3
M
⌉
groups, where the first ⌊2N−3
M
⌋ groups have sizeM , and the remaining group has size at mostM , so
that the i-th voter in each group has preference ordering given by (1). SinceM ≥ N/2, there will be
at most four groups. Under this preference profile, which we will denote by O∗ = (o∗1, . . . , o
∗
2N−3),
for each j = 1, . . . ,M there are at most four voters that rank yj above yj−1, i.e., the replacement
score of each y ∈ Y is at least N − 5 > k. However, this conflicts with the requirement that
for i = 1, . . . , N the i-th voter prefers candidates in Yi to those in Y \ Yi. Thus, we require that
his preferences are given by o∗i insomuch as this is possible, i.e., he ranks the candidates within
Yi and Y \ Yi according to o
∗
i , but ranks all candidates in Yi above those in Y \ Yi. Also, for
i = N + 1, . . . , 2N − 3 we require voter i to rank the candidates in Y according to o∗i . Now, for
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each yj there are at most two sets Yi such that yj ∈ Yi. It follows that for each j = 1, . . . ,M , at
most six voters prefer yj to yj−1 (where y0 = yM), so none of the candidates in Y is close to being
the Condorcet winner.
For Young’s rule, the winner determination problem is known to be complete for the complexity
class Θp2 (Rothe et al., 2003). It seems likely that this is also the case for the voter replacement
rule.
Observe that out of the three voting rules considered in this section, one (Maximin) has an
efficient winner determination procedure, while the other two do not (assuming, as is currently
believed, that no NP-hard problem can be solved efficiently—i.e., in polynomial time—for all in-
stances). The intuitive reason for this difference is that when we add voters to make a candidate
c the Condorcet winner, we only need to add voters that rank c first, and, moreover, it does not
matter how these voters rank other candidates. On the other hand, when we delete or replace
voters, we have to choose which voters to remove, and this decision is not straightforward.
4 Conclusions and Future Research
We have shown that two classical voting rules, Young’s rule and Maximin, can be distance rational-
ized by the Condorcet consensus class and distances of Hamming type. This further advances the
project of classifying common voting rules by a consensus class and a distance (only some multi-
stage elimination rules are now left without known distance rationalizations). We have also shown
that a the existing distance rationalization of Young’s rule in fact leads to a somewhat different
rule.
Now the question of quality of such rationalization comes to the fore. Indeed, some distances
are more natural than others so are the consensus classes. In particular, Kendall tau distance3
seems a particularly natural one and it is employed in distance-rationalizations of many rules. So
are the unanimity consensus and Condorcet consensus classes. On the other hand, Elkind et al.
(2009) have shown that any rule can be distance rationalized if unnatural consensus classes or
unnatural distances are allowed. Elkind et al. (2009) identified a certain family of distances, called
votewise distances (for example, Kendall tau and Hamming distances are votewise), as those that
are particularly natural. Not all voting rules can be rationalized with the use of those distances,
in particular, STV cannot. It is thus interesting if it is possible to rationalize Young’s rule and
Maximin using votewise distances.
Another natural research direction is to seek further connections between distance rationaliz-
ability and maximum likelihood estimation approaches (see, e.g., Conitzer and Sandholm (2005);
Conitzer, Rognlie, and Xia (2009)).
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A Computational Complexity Preliminaries
In this section we give a brief review of the notions from computational complexity theory. The
readers interested in a more in-depth treatment of computational complexity are pointed to the
classic textbooks of Garey and Johnson (1979) and Papadimitriou (1994).
Computational complexity theory is a branch of theoretical computer science whose goal (or,
rather, one of many goals) is to classify computational problems with respect to the amount of
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resources they require for obtaining solutions. The most standard resource type that complexity
theorists study is the time (i.e., the number of basic computational steps) needed to find a solution.
Typically, instead of studying problems that ask one to compute some mathematical object or
to optimize some function, computational complexity theory focuses on decision problems, that is,
problems with a yes/no answer. Decision problems are easier to work with and, in most cases,
preserve the resource requirements of the more involved problems they are based on. For instance,
given an election E = (C, V ) and some voting rule R, instead of asking “who won election E
according to R” we can ask, for each c ∈ C, “did c win election E according to R.”
One of the most crude, but at the same time very practical and natural, ways to classify decision
problems is to classify them as either belonging to the class P (that is, the class of problems that
can be solved in polynomial time), or being NP-hard. We will explain what it means for a problem
to be NP-hard in the next paragraph. The classification is not perfect as some problems are neither
in P nor are NP-hard, but most problems encountered in practice indeed fall into one of these two
groups. The problems in P are considered computationally easy because given an instance I of a
problem from P, it is possible to solve it using at most polynomially many steps (with respect to
the number of bits needed to encode I). On the other hand, it is widely believed that if a problem is
NP-hard then, in general, to solve its instance I one needs to make at least an exponential number
of steps. In the next section we will show that, indeed, the problem of deciding whether a given
candidate c is a winner with respect to the voter replacement rule is NP-hard and, as a result, that
it is computationally difficult (as least as long as P 6= NP; which is a widely believed conjecture).
How is the notion of NP-hardness defined? To answer this question we need to describe the
class NP first. However, instead of defining the class formally, we find it more practical to provide
the intuition behind the class and point the readers to the classic texts of Garey and Johnson
(1979) and Papadimitriou (1994) for technical details. Let us start with the following problem as
an example.
Definition 10. An instance of Vertex Cover is given by a pair (Γ = (X,Y ); k) where Γ is a
graph with a vertex set X and an edge set Y , and k ∈ N. It is a “yes”-instance if Γ has a vertex
cover of size at most k (i.e., if it is possible to pick k vertices such that each edge is incident to at
least one of the selected vertices), and a “no”-instance otherwise.
In Vertex Cover we ask whether a subset of vertices with a certain property exists. It is not
at all clear how to compute such a set efficiently (that is, in polynomial time) but, if we were given
some set of vertices, we could easily verify if it indeed satisfies our requirements. Namely, we would
check if every edge is incident to at least one of the vertices from the set and if the set contains at
most k elements. Thus, while it seems computationally hard to solve Vertex Cover, it is very
easy to verify if a solution provided by someone else is correct.4 Now, the class NP is exactly the
class of problems for which, given an instance I and a solution s for it, it is possible to verify the
solution s in time polynomial in the number of bits encoding I. A decision problem A is called
NP-hard if it is at least as hard as the hardest problem in NP. To formalize the notion of “is at
least as hard as” we use many-one polynomial-time reductions.
Definition 11. Let A and B be two decision problems. We say that A many-one reduces to B in
polynomial time if there exists a function f such that:
4Note that here by “solution” we do not mean the yes/no answer but rather the underlying mathematical object
the decision problems asks about.
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1. f is computable in polynomial time, and
2. for each instance x of the problem A it holds that the answer for x is “yes” if and only if the
answer for f(x) is “yes.”
In other words, if a problem A many-one polynomial-time reduces to a problem B, then it is
easy to translate questions in the format of A to the questions in the format of B, while preserving
the answers. A decision problem A is called NP-hard if all problems in NP many-one reduce to
it in polynomial time. If A is both NP-hard and a member of NP then A is called NP-complete.
While at first it may seem that NP-complete and NP-hard problems might not even exist, in fact
many hundreds of natural NP-complete problems have been identified (see the text of Garey and
Johnson (1979) for a very early list). For example, Vertex Cover is NP-complete.
The next proposition is the standard tool for proving that a given problem is NP-hard. To
show that a problem is NP-hard it suffices to show that some previously known NP-hard problem
many-one reduces to it in polynomial time.
Proposition 12. Let A be a decision problem and let B be some known NP-hard problem. If B
many-one reduces to A in polynomial time then A is NP-hard.
This proposition follows immediately from the observation that the relation “polynomial-time
many-one reduces to” is transitive. We are now ready to prove Theorem 9.
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